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Marriage in New York: An Economic
Partnership?
Cheryl E. Hadert
I. Introduction
Marriage, it is sometimes humorously maintained, is many
things to many people. A view prevalent today conceives of mar-
riage as analogous to an economic partnership. The spouses act
as partners, each of whom makes financial or nonfinancial con-
tributions to the establishment of a household, the formation of
a family, and the accumulation of property. Accordingly, the dis-
solution of a marriage is analogized to the dissolution or winding
up of a business partnership in which the settling of accounts
and the distribution of property to the members constitute an
integral part of the partnership concept.
This Article compares and contrasts marriage in New York
with an economic partnership. The primary comparison here is
between the New York Domestic Relations Law1 as interpreted
by the courts, and the New York Partnership Law.2 Part II sum-
marizes the relevant provisions of the New York Partnership
Law. A comparison of marriage and a business partnership fol-
lows in Part III. In Part IV, New York's Equitable Distribution
Law3 and the underlying view of marriage as an economic part-
nership are discussed. This section further examines the statu-
tory and judicial definitions of separate and marital property,
and considers whether the results are in accord with the partner-
ship view of marriage. Part V compares some nondissolution as-
pects of domestic relations law to analogous aspects of partner-
ship law - specifically, the management and control of marital
property and the agency relationship between the spouses. The
t Associated with the firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in New York.
B.A., 1985, Yale College; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School.
1. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 1-272 (McKinney 1988).
2. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 1-126 (McKinney 1988).
3. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
1
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Article then confronts the question of whether the legislature
and the courts should treat marriage as if it were an economic
partnership, and concludes that it may be preferable to do so.
II. Elements of a Partnership
A partnership is defined as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit."" To
determine that a partnership exists, a court must find that the
parties have joined their skills, interests, property, and risks for
a particular purpose, and that the respective contributions of
the parties were based on the assumption that each member will
act for the benefit of all. 5
Partnership property consists of property originally brought
into the partnership, property subsequently acquired on account
of the partnership, and property acquired with partnership
funds.' The property rights of a partner include his rights in
specific partnership property, his share of the profits and sur-
plus of the partnership, and his rights in the management of the
partnership.7 Each partner has equal rights in the management
and conduct of the partnership business."
Because each partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business, the partnership is bound by the act of
every partner "for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership. . .. " If the partner actually has no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and
the person with whom he is dealing is aware of that partner's
lack of authority, then the partnership is not bound by that
partner's action.10
Upon dissolution of the partnership, each partner is entitled
to be repaid his contributions.' After all liabilities are satisfied,
including those to other partners, the partners will share equally
4. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 10 (McKinney 1988).
5. See Steinbeck v. Gerosa, 4 N.Y.2d 302, 151 N.E.2d 170, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 358 U.S. 39 (1958).
6. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 12(1), (2) (McKinney 1988).
7. Id. §§ 50, 52.
8. Id. § 40.
9. Id. § 20(1).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 40(1).
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in the profits and the surplus remaining (unless the partners had
stipulated for an agreed share of the profits)."2 If the partnership
sustains any loss, each partner must contribute toward it accord-
ing to his share of the profits." Every partner has a right to be
reimbursed by the partnership for "payments made and per-
sonal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and
proper conduct of [the partnership] business, or for the preser-
vation of [the] business or property.""'
A partner may "receive interest on the capital contributed
by him only from the date when repayment should be made. '1 5
Furthermore, no partner has a claim to salary for performing
services with respect to the partnership business. 6 Since the
partners have contracted to share in the gains of the partner-
ship, no other compensation is due them in the usual case.
After the dissolution of the partnership, the liabilities owed
to creditors other than partners are to be paid before liabilities
owed to the partners.1 7 Next, liabilities "owing to partners in re-
spect of capital" are to be paid, and, finally, in the absence of an
agreed ratio, the sum remaining is to be divided equally and
paid to the partners as profits.1 8
III. Partnership Aspects of Marriage
In many ways, marriage is analogous to an economic part-
nership. Although the profit motive of a partnership which is the
basis of the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.), 9 is not present
in a marriage, "a business partnership is also a human relation-
ship, and the U.P.A. provisions form a basis for a sound human
relationship."20 Furthermore, the trend is toward viewing mar-
riage as if it were a business transaction and defining the rights
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 40(2).
15. Id. § 40(4).
16. Id. § 40(6).
17. Id. § 71(b).
18. Id.
19. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1968). The Uniform Partnership Act is
the basis of the New York Partnership Law. See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 1-74 (McKin-
ney 1988).
20. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
REv. 1169, 1256 n.396 (1974).
1989]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
of parties by the general principles of contract law.21 Marriage
has been termed "a partnership to which each spouse makes a
different but equally important contribution."22 The fact that
many married couples consider marriage to be a joint enterprise
is indicated by the widespread American custom of holding real
estate and savings in joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship.2 s
The parties' contributions to their marital partnership are
often put to several different uses. A portion of the contributions
is consumed by the couple directly. The couple may also invest
the contributions "in the accumulation of property, in the pro-
duction and rearing of children, or in the enhancement of their
own skills."2 Presumably, the parties allot their contributions to
these various competing goals under the assumption that the
marital partnership will last for the rest of their lives. Neverthe-
less, each is aware that the marriage may end in divorce at any
time and that his or her expectations may be unfulfilled.2 5 Upon
dissolution of the marriage, an accounting is necessary which is
similar to that required upon liquidation of a business partner-
ship.26 The property is then apportioned and distributed, the
marital partnership having ceased to exist.
IV. Marriage as a Partnership Under the Equitable
Distribution Law
In approving the Equitable Distribution Law, formally re-
ferred to as "Domestic Relations Law," § 236 Part B,27 Governor
Hugh Carey stated that "[t]he bill recognizes that the marriage
relationship is also an economic partnership. 2 8 Among the fac-
tors to be taken into account in determining the equitable
21. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 4, at 867 (1970).
22. Prefatory Note to the Uniform Marital Property Act, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1983) [here-
inafter UMPA] (quoting COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963)).
23. M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 154-55 (1977).
24. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 99, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490 (2d Dep't 1983).
25. Id. at 99, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 490-91.
26. Westfall, Family Law and Marital Property 296 (1986) (unpublished manu-
script).
27. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
28. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 1980 N.Y. LAWS 1863 (1980).
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claims of the parties with respect to the distribution of the accu-
mulated property upon dissolution are "the contribution and
services of a partner in the marriage as a spouse, a parent, a
wage earner, and a homemaker."29
The Equitable Distribution Law reflects the view that the
success of the marital partnership is contingent upon a number
of factors in addition to the monetary contributions of each
partner. The statute recognizes that nonfinancial contributions
also assist in the joint enterprise. Such services include "home-
making, raising children and providing the emotional and moral
support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the
vicissitudes of life outside the home."' 0 When a marriage comes
to an end, each spouse has a right to share in any marital assets
that have accumulated during the marriage because the marital
property represents the capital product of the marital partner-
ship."1 The portion of the property to which a spouse is entitled
reflects the spouse's proportional share of the contributions
made to the marital enterprise.32
A. Statutory Terms and Concepts
An important aspect of the Equitable Distribution Law is
the distinction between "separate property," which is to remain
as such after dissolution of the marital partnership, and "marital
property," which is to be divided between the parties upon
dissolution. 3
1. Separate Property
"Separate property" includes:
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired
by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the
spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
(3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value
29. Id. See also Conner, 97 A.D.2d at 99, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
30. Brennan v. Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 52, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (3d Dep't 1984).
31. See Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1983).
32. Id.
33. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(b)-(c) (McKinney 1986).
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of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation
is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other
spouse; ....
The fact that separate property is exempt from division
upon divorce is in accordance with the underlying partnership
rationale of the Equitable Distribution Law; such property is not
the product of the efforts of the marital enterprise.3 5 To be con-
sistent with this interpretation, property acquired in exchange
for separate property which is to be excluded from equitable dis-
tribution should similarly be limited to assets which cannot be
considered part of the product of the marital economic partner-
ship. "This would generally presume some rough equivalency in
value at the time between the premarital property and that
which was acquired in exchange ..... " When property that is
produced by the activities of the marital enterprise is used to
replace depreciated separate property of lower value, only the
lower value of the original separate property should be exempt
from equitable distribution.-7 Furthermore, a gift from a third
party to an individual spouse is considered to be separate prop-
erty, as it is not a result of the marital relationship. 8
2. Marital Property
"Marital property" is defined as:
All property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or
the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the
form in which title is held .... Marital property shall not include
separate property .... 39
Marital property is analogous to partnership property. It is
the fruit of the marital partnership, which is to be divided equi-
34. Id. § 236(B)(1)(d).
35. See Brennan v. Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 52, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (3d Dep't
1984).
36. Id. at 53, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
37. Id. at 53-54, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
38. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(1) (McKinney 1986). See also 3 H. FOSTER,
D. FREED & J. BRANDES, LAW AND THE FAMILY - NEW YORK § 2:1, at 36 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES].
39. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c).
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tably between the parties upon dissolution of the marriage. 0
The words "all property" in the definition above were intended
to cover intangible as well as tangible property, real and per-
sonal property, and anything of value that may be evaluated, if
it were the result of partnership or individual efforts during the
marriage.41 Items that would not be considered "property"
under the classical definition of the word may nevertheless be
considered "marital property," provided they satisfy the criteria
of having a provable economic worth and of being the fruit of
the efforts of either or both spouses."'
To be considered marital property, an asset must be ac-
quired while the couple is legally married, and before the com-
mencement of a matrimonial action.43 "[T]he point of the stat-
ute is to earmark the commencement of a matrimonial action as
an event that, legally, dissolves the economic partnership of the
spouses, though the parties remain legally married until the con-
clusion of the action."' 4 Actual distribution of marital property
is made only when the marriage is being dissolved and not, for
example, in an action for legal separation, because the marriage
is considered still intact at that time.45
The basic premise of the statute is that marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership. This concept aids in understanding the scope
of items covered by the term "marital property." Thus, a gift of
property to both spouses by a third party should be viewed as
belonging to the marital partnership, since the spouses have re-
ceived the gift by virtue of the marital relation." Similarly, the
appreciation in value of separate property which is due to con-
tributions of the nontitled spouse is considered to be marital
property "consistent with the law of partnership with respect to
capital, advances and personal services .... "'
The subject of "marital property" is rarely considered
40. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, at 34.
41. Id. at 34-35.
42. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B), commentary at 192.
43. Id. at 194.
44. Id. at 196.
45. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, at 34.
46. Ackley v. Ackley, 100 A.D.2d 153, 155-56, 472 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805-06 (4th Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 63 N.Y.2d 605, 471 N.E.2d 462, 481 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1984).
47. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 98-99, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490 (2d Dep't 1983).
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outside the context of marital dissolution. Nevertheless, just as
partnership property is deemed to be such while the business of
the partnership is being carried on as well as upon the partner-
ship's dissolution, marital property similarly exists outside the
situation of divorce:
[T]here can be little doubt that the Legislature has created a
heretofore unknown species of property right which comes into
being, not with the service of the divorce summons, but with the
marriage and acquisition of the first earned asset.
. ..[A]n inchoate interest in the asset is acquired by the
spouse without title immediately on acquisition and during "cov-
erture"; it becomes "consummate" on service of the divorce sum-
mons awaiting only "admeasurement" in the decree of divorce."'
After the right has become "consummate," the titled spouse is
restricted in his ability to dispose of the property and may be
prevented from converting liquid assets into nonliquid assets or
sound assets into questionable assets."9 A member of a business
partnership is restricted in his ability to dispose of property or
to convert assets only when such disposition or conversion is not
for the purpose of conducting the business of the partnership in
the usual way, or if he is not authorized to act for the partner-
ship in that particular matter.50
B. Case Law Under the Equitable Distribution Statute
1. What is Marital Property?
A conclusive definition of marital property "remains elu-
sive."51 Real estate and tangible personal property seem to fall
most easily into the statutorily defined categories of separate
and marital property. There are some types of intangible prop-
erty, however, for which the determination is less obvious. Fur-
thermore, in some contexts a dispute over whether something is
marital property necessitates an initial inquiry into whether the
subject of the dispute can be regarded as property at all.52 Once
48. Kriger v. Kriger, 115 Misc. 2d 595, 598-99, 454 N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982).
49. Id. at 599, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
50. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 20 (McKinney 1988).
51. Kriger, 115 Misc. 2d at 598, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
52. But see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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an item is determined to be marital property, the additional
question of valuation must be considered. The following subsec-
tions concern some of the more controversial property issues
that can arise during marital dissolution. In some instances, ref-
erence to economic partnership aspects of marriage aids in the
resolution of the issues, whereas in others, it merely fuels the
controversy.
a. Educational Degree
When a couple gets married before a spouse has completed
his or her professional education, the other spouse frequently
contributes income toward household expenses and sometimes,
toward the student's educational expenses. The working spouse's
financial and nonfinancial contributions allow the student to
continue his or her education and earn a professional degree. In
return for these contributions, the working spouse may expect to
be able to share in the increased income that the student will
earn from practicing a profession. These reasonable expectations
may be disappointed when the parties are divorced soon after
the student's graduation. The question then arises as to whether
and, if so, how the working spouse will be compensated for con-
tributions and dashed hopes. "States with sharing principles in
property distribution are recognizing these expectations when
the marriage is dissolved""3 and some form of restitution is often
granted to the supporting spouse. 4
If an educational degree were regarded as marital property,
then the courts could determine the value of the degree and
make a distributive award to the working spouse. For a variety
of reasons, however, the lower New York courts prior to the 1985
O'Brien decision,55 have held that an educational degree is not
53. Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1310 (1981).
54. Boyer, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a
Professional Degree at Dissolution, 60 WASH. L. REV. 431 n.1 (1985) (how most courts
have held that a professional degree is not property for purposes of divorce). See also
Moore, Should a Professional Degree Be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Divorce?, 15
AKRON L. REv. 543, 544-55 (1982) (compensating the wife solely by means of an award of
maintenance is most frequently utilized by the courts, while treating the degree as mari-
tal property appears to be the position most favored by commentators).
55. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985), on
19891
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marital property.5 6
One reason for declining to view an educational degree as
marital property is that it does not have any of the traditional
characteristics of property:
It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on the death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced
degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous educa-
tion, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellec-
tual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes
of property in the usual sense of that term. 7
Some courts have stated that the future enhanced earning
capacity of the degree holder should be classified as property.
Enhanced earning capacity, however, cannot be considered prop-
erty since "it is only an uncertain expectancy, for it is dependent
upon the future success and efforts of the degree holder." 8
This view is countered by some commentators, who feel that
it is "an unmitigated disaster to label a professional degree...
as 'non property.' 59 This "semantical judgment" destroys the
expectancies and equitable claims of the working spouse, whose
efforts enabled the other spouse to enhance his earning
capacity.60
Another reason given for the courts' refusal to regard an
educational degree as marital property is the unfairness that
could conceivably result from making a monetary award based
upon the estimated enhanced future earnings of the degree
holder. Once granted, a distributive award may not be modified
to reflect changed circumstances. 1 This would be inequitable in
remand, 120 A.D.2d 656, 502 N.Y.S.2d 250, later proceeding, 124 A.D.2d 575, 507
N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dep't 1986).
56. See, e.g., Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2d Dep't 1983);
Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982).
57. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (quoting Graham v. Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)).
58. Id. at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
59. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES supra note 38, § 7:1, at 337.
60. Id.
61. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
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a situation where, due to factors beyond his control, the holder
of the professional degree did not earn as much as had been an-
ticipated by the court which made the distributive award.2 Fur-
thermore, the student spouse may decide not to practice his pro-
fession, or to use his professional degree in a less profitable
manner than had been expected. 3 That choice should not be re-
stricted by an overly large award given to the former spouse that
was based upon the student's anticipated future earnings.
The partnership premise of the Equitable Distribution Law
has been cited as another reason that an educational degree
should not be considered marital property. If the student's de-
gree were marital property, then a share of anticipated future
earnings reduced to present value would have to be awarded to
the other spouse. However, "by virtue of the partnership pre-
mise, his earnings during any remarriage are necessarily attribu-
table only to the student's efforts and the efforts of any such
new spouse" and not to the former spouse. 4 Accordingly, the
former spouse should not have any claim to the student's future
earnings as marital property."'
The working spouse's contributions toward the student's
professional education do not go completely unrewarded. The
student's present earnings and future earnings potential are
taken into account in determining the amount of maintenance
that will be awarded to the working spouse.6
Ironically, there has also been an emphasis on the nonpart-
nership aspects of marriage as a reason to disregard an educa-
tional degree as marital property:
Marriage... is more than an economic undertaking. The parties
agree upon the manner in which they will provide financial sup-
port and nonfinancial services to each other, and they do not
place values on their respective contributions, nor do they expect
to pay each other for those contributions. Every unsuccessful
marriage results in the disappointment of expectations, financial
as well as nonfinancial, but it does not result in a financial loss in
62. Id. at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938-39.
63. Id.
64. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 102-03, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 492 (2d Dep't 1983).
65. Id. at 103, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
66. Id. at 103, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 493; Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 159, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
19891
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a commercial sense.6 7
The working spouse's disappointed expectations in not sharing
in the student's improved earning capacity are no more compen-
sable than any other spouse's expectations and hopes which
have been dashed by a failed marriage.6 8
The economic partnership model of marriage can also be
used to justify viewing an educational degree as marital prop-
erty, although this reasoning has apparently never been ac-
cepted by a New York court. It may be presumed that the non-
student spouse makes direct and indirect contributions toward
the student's professional degree with the underlying purpose of
increasing the flow of income to the marital partnership in the
future. Those contributions give rise under the Equitable Distri-
bution Law to an equitable claim by the supporting spouse
against the value of the educational degree. Therefore, the de-
gree should be considered by the courts to be marital property.0 9
Accordingly, the fact that an educational degree does not
fall within the traditional definition of property is not relevant
to the decision of whether it should be valued and then divided.
The term "marital property" is a statutory creation, "simply a
shorthand for defining those things of value as to which the
spouses have an equitable claim based upon a remedial statute
and arising out of the marital relationship, irrespective of the
common law ownership thereof. '70 A court should therefore de-
fine marital property with a view toward protecting the parties'
"statutorily defined equitable claim[s] .'' 7 Despite possible diffi-
culties in valuation, a professional degree must be considered
marital property so as not to unjustly deny to the nonstudent
spouse an equitable share of the increased future earnings re-
sulting from the degree. 2
67. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 159, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
68. Id. at 159, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939-40.
69. Conner, 97 A.D.2d at 108, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Bracken and Brown, JJ.,
concurring).
70. Florescue, "Market Value," Professional Licenses and Marital Property: A Di-
lemma in Search of a Horn, 14 FAM. L. REV. 13 (1982).
71. Id. See also Boyer, supra note 54, at 441-43 (a professional degree and its ac-
companying enhanced earning capacity should be recognized as a new form of property).
72. Conner, 97 A.D.2d at 109, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Bracken and Brown, JJ.,
concurring).
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If an educational degree were viewed as marital property,
then merely taking the student's future enhanced earning capac-
ity into account in awarding maintenance would not by itself ad-
equately compensate the working spouse for his or her invest-
ment in the marital partnership." Since maintenance is awarded
on the basis of need, and since the working spouse usually sup-
ports the student financially during the marriage, it is likely that
the working spouse would remain self-supporting after the di-
vorce and therefore not be entitled to maintenance. 4 Further-
more, since an award of maintenance ends upon the recipient's
remarriage, the working spouse who remarries may not be fully
rewarded for his or her contributions to the marital partner-
ship.7 5 Under this view, an educational degree, as marital prop-
erty, should be divided equitably between the spouses in accor-
dance with the contributions of each. The amount to be divided
is the future earnings attributable to the degree, discounted to
present value.76
b. Professional Licenses
Another controversial issue that has arisen upon dissolution
of a student spouse-working spouse marriage is whether a pro-
fessional license that has been obtained during the marriage
should be designated as marital property, to be valued and di-
vided. Despite earlier contrary lower court holdings regarding an
educational degree, the court of appeals in O'Brien v. O'Brien8
held that a professional license is to be considered marital prop-
erty. Partnership principles were used to justify this holding:
The determination that a professional license is marital prop-
erty is also consistent with the conceptual base upon which the
statute rests .... [F]ew undertakings during a marriage better
qualify as the type of joint effort that the statute's economic part-
nership theory is intended to address than the contributions to-
73. Id. at 112, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
74. Id. at 111-12, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
75. Id. at 112, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 498. A division of property is also preferable to a
maintenance award for a variety of psychological, social, and economic reasons. See
Boyer, supra note 54, at 446-48.
76. Conner, 97 A.D.2d at 110, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
77. See, e.g., Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982).
78. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
1989]
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ward one spouse's acquisition of a professional license . . . . The
Legislature has decided, by its explicit reference in the statute to
the contributions of one spouse to the other's profession or career
. . .that these contributions represent investments in the eco-
nomic partnership of the marriage and that the product of the
parties' joint efforts, the professional license, should be consid-
ered marital property.
79
Limiting relief for the working spouse to maintenance would
frustrate the underlying purposes of the Equitable Distribution
Law, because it would be contrary to the idea of an economic
partnership. A working spouse who remarries may never be fully
compensated for his or her contributions toward a former
spouse's professional license.8 0 Furthermore, merely reimbursing
the working spouse for direct financial contributions is an inade-
quate solution. "If the license is marital property, then the
working spouse is entitled to an equitable portion of it, not a
return of funds advanced. 8 1 The amount to be divided should
be the projected enhanced earning capacity of the license holder,
discounted to present value. 2
Once again, support for the contrary holding that a profes-
sional license is not marital property can be derived from the
partnership model as well:
[T]he resource actually sought to be controlled by the working
spouse to the exclusion of all others, including the student, is a
percentage of . . . future labors that utilize the nonassignable
privilege. In short, the privilege has no pecuniary value suscepti-
ble of ascertainment by the working spouse's expert apart from
such labor. Labor, however, is merely the use by the student of
his or her own best asset, his or her chief capital - the property
of his or her own person.8
79. Id. at 585-86, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
80. Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The Conner court rejected
this reasoning, however, by holding that an educational degree was not marital property.
See Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 112, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 498 (2d Dep't 1983)
(Bracken and Brown, JJ., concurring). See also Boyer, supra note 54 (the psychological,
social, and economic reasons concerning why alimony is inappropriate presumably apply
in the context of professional licenses as well as professional degrees).
81. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
82. Id.
83. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (2d Dep't), mod-
ified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
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According to the lower appellate court in O'Brien, a profes-
sional license should not be considered marital property for the
same reasons that the court did not deem an academic degree to
be such in two other cases, Conner and Lesman.8 1
The court of appeals' decision in O'Brien,s6 holding that a
professional license is marital property, has brought into ques-
tion previous lower court holdings that an educational degree is
not marital property."' Some commentators believe that, given
the similarity between a license and a degree, the O'Brien deci-
sion constitutes a rejection of Lesman, and that an educational
degree should henceforth be considered marital property."
In another case, Cronin v. Cronin,88 however, the New York
Supreme Court refused to extend the O'Brien holding to an aca-
demic degree. The court stated that the O'Brien holding was
limited to professional licenses and did not overrule previous
court rulings that academic degrees are not marital property
subject to equitable distribution.8 The Cronin court read the
O'Brien decision to concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Thompson in the appellate division below, which distinguished
an academic degree from a professional license:" °
Unlike Conner... in this case we are dealing with more than
a college degree. Here, plaintiff had been licensed to practice
medicine prior to the commencement of this action. The licensing
authority thus conferred upon him the regulated privilege of
practicing medicine .... The privilege of applying his previous
education and training vested, allowing plaintiff to finally convert
his training into a professional practice, and also affording him
certain due process rights .... In short, our case presents a sce-
nario where the educational background has been converted into
84. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550. See also Conner v. Conner, 97
A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2d Dep't 1983); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452
N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982).
85. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 576, 489 N.E.2d at 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
86. But cf. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482; Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452
N.Y.S.2d 935.
87. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, § 16:6. See also Comment, Family
Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 517, 519 (1981) (considers an educational degree to be substantially similar
to a professional license in arguing that both should be subject to division upon divorce).
88. 131 Misc. 2d 879, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1986).
89. Id. at 882, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
90. Id.
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a concrete privilege to practice the profession of medicine. That
privilege, being in the nature of a franchise, was properly consid-
ered by the trial court as marital property for the purpose of eq-
uitable distribution."1
It remains to be seen whether higher courts will agree with
this distinction and hold professional licenses, but not degrees,
to be marital property.92
c. Professional Practices
The value of a professional practice consists of the sum of
the value of the tangible assets of the practice,9" such as medical
or dental equipment, and the value of the intangible assets of
the practice, including goodwill.94 In accordance with the under-
lying view of marriage as an economic partnership, a profes-
sional practice is considered marital property to the extent of
the value that has been acquired during the marriage.9 ' Law,96
accounting,9 dental, 98 and medical9 practices have all been
found to be properly subject to valuation and a subsequent dis-
tributive award.100 This is consistent with the intent of the legis-
lature, which created the distributive award to encompass situa-
tions "where a division of the actual marital property between
the spouses is impracticable, impossible, or illegal,"' 01 such as
"the distribution of an interest in a ... profession .
91. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 240, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 560 (2d Dep't)
(Thompson, J., dissenting), modified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 489 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985).
92. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B), commentary at 192 (McKinney 1986).
93. See Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200, 489
N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1985).
94. See Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1982, at 7, col. 1 (claims for work
done is another example of an intangible asset of the practice).
95. Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (2d Dep't 1983).
96. Id.
97. Cohen v. Cohen, 104 A.D.2d 841, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1984), appeal dis-
missed, 69 N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457, 485 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1985).
98. Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58
(1985).
99. Van Ess v. Van Ess, 100 A.D.2d 848, 474 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1984).
100. A distributive award is a monetary payment in lieu of an actual division of
property. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(b) (McKinney 1986).
101. Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 696, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (2d Dep't 1983).
102. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(e).
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In determining the effect of a professional career on the di-
vision of property, the court must pursue a three-part inquiry:
(1) whether the history of the spouse's professional activity is
consistent and extensive enough so that it can rightly be consid-
ered a marital asset; (2) as a marital asset, whether it is inappro-
priate or infeasible in the particular case to estimate the value of
the practice and the share in it to which each spouse is entitled;
and (3) under the circumstances of the case, whether the court
should make a distributive award.10 3
Various professional practices are valued in different ways.
In Cohen v. Cohen,04 for example, the husband became a part-
ner in an accounting firm during the marriage and was assigned
"units" in the firm, "comparable to shares of stock, which deter-
mine[d] his share of the profits of the accounting firm for a
given fiscal year. . .. "1n Using the husband's own estimate that
each of his 560 units was worth $200 in the year in which the
divorce action was commenced, the court awarded his wife fifty
percent of the total estimated value, noting that she had con-
tributed to the marriage both as a wage earner and as a
homemaker.'06
In determining one spouse's interest in the other's law prac-
tice, one approach is to evaluate goodwill by the "formula ap-
proach" permitted by the Internal Revenue Service: 1
[This method] capitaliz[es] earnings in excess of a fair salary paid
to the law partner from net earnings. If the partner receives earn-
ings deemed more than the average salary paid in corporate in-
dustry for similar legal services, the excess will be deemed a capi-
tal asset of which the spouse may receive an equitable share.'08
A similar approach could conceivably be taken to determine
the value of the goodwill of another type of professional prac-
tice, such as a dental or medical practice.1 09 If the practice was
103. Barton v. Barton, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1982, at 10, col. 7.
104. 104 A.D.2d 841, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1984), appeal dismissed, 64
N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457, 485 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1985).
105. Cohen, 104 A.D.2d at 843, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
106. Id.
107. Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1982, at 7, col. 1 (citing REv. RUL. 68-
609, 1968-2 C.B. 327).
108. Id.
109. Professional goodwill is considered by both common-law and community prop-
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begun before marriage, however, only the appreciation in value
of the practice from the date of the marriage to the commence-
ment of the action will be considered marital property,"" for
only that increase is due to the efforts of the marital
partnership.
There are some instances in which a professional practice
has neither goodwill nor sales value, such as a lawyer's negli-
gence practice.' When a practice consists entirely of negligence
cases handled on a contingency basis, there are no retainer cli-
ents and no way to estimate the size of future earnings. It would
therefore be inappropriate to use a formula capitalizing the
practice's value.1" Nevertheless, a practice with a positive aver-
age yearly income does have a tangible economic value that
should be taken into account during equitable distribution. " 3 If
the court assumes that the attorney will continue to have a sig-
nificant negligence practice, then the spouse may receive as a
distributive award a sum equal to an appropriate percentage of
one year's average gross or net income."" A "continued share
beyond one year [would] be inequitable and unjust," given the
uncertain nature of a negligence practice." 5
Although valuing a professional practice may be difficult or
awkward," ' the process is necessary under the economic part-
nership view of marriage. When a spouse has spent time and ef-
fort building a reputation, adding to his professional skills, or
becoming a partner in an already-established firm, a value is ob-
tained in addition to the actual salary or income. The amount of
this extra value acquired during the marriage should be consid-
ered to have resulted from partnership efforts that include the
indirect contributions of one spouse that enabled the other to
pursue and enhance his or her profession.1 1 7
erty jurisdictions to be a marital asset that is capable of being valued and divided upon
dissolution. See Comment, supra note 87, at 545-46.
110. Van Ess v. Van Ess, 100 A.D.2d 848, 849, 474 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1984). See
also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(1), (5)(d)(1) (McKinney 1986).
111. See Barton v. Barton, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1982, at 10, col. 7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Comment, supra note 87, at 546.
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d. Pension Benefits
The distribution of pension benefits is yet another area that
has generated a great deal of litigation to determine whether
those benefits should rightfully be regarded as marital property.
The courts have considered various types of pensions:
[P]ension benefits are said to be vested when they are not for-
feited even if the employee is discharged or voluntarily termi-
nates his employment. The only condition precedent to the re-
ceipt of vested pension benefits is that the employee survive until
retirement age. In contrast, nonvested pension benefits are con-
tingent upon the employee continuing his employment with the
employer or organization sponsoring the plan. Moreover, a pen-
sion plan is said to be matured when the employee has an uncon-
ditional right to immediate payment of the benefits upon
retirement.118
Pensions have been found to constitute marital property subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce regardless of whether
they are vested and matured,119 vested but unmatured 2 ° or
nonvested. 121 Only that portion of the pension that has accrued
during the marriage and before the commencement of the di-
vorce action, however, will be deemed to be marital property. 22
The reasons for holding that pension benefits are marital
property are in accord with the concept of marriage as an eco-
nomic partnership.2 s First, a pension is actually a type of de-
ferred compensation arising from a spouse's employment. Since
a spouse's income from a job is marital property, the income
that is earned while working but not received until later should
also be marital property. 2 " Furthermore, the spouses reasonably
118. Damiano v. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d 132, 137, 463 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (2d Dep't
1983).
119. Puzzi v. Puzzi, 101 A.D.2d 884, 476 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep't 1984).
120. Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699
(1984).
121. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 132, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 477. The treatment of pension and
retirement benefits by the New York courts is similar to that of other jurisdictions. See
Comment, supra note 87, at 547.
122. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 139, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
123. Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM.
L. 187, 188-89 (1977-78).
124. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 137, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 480. See also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
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expected during the marriage that they would both share in the
future enjoyment of the pension benefits,125 and this expectation
can and should be fulfilled regardless of whether the marital
partnership is still intact. Finally, the pension serves as a type of
investment for the partnership. Because of the existence of the
pension plan, the employee presently earns less while retaining
the contractual right to future pension benefits.12 "To the ex-
tent that they result from employment time after marriage and
before commencement of a matrimonial action, they are contract
rights of value, received in lieu of higher compensation which
would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets or the mar-
ital standard of living and, therefore, are marital property.1127
These same reasons apply regardless of whether the pension is
vested, nonvested, matured, or unmatured. '28
There are primarily two ways to enforce the nonemployee
spouse's right to pension benefits.12 9 One way is to award a lump
sum to the nonemployee spouse, equal to an equitable portion of
the present value of the pension benefits earned during the mar-
riage.13 0 This approach avoids future enforcement problems and
uncertainty by providing an immediate settlement.131 The other
method of enforcing the right to pension benefits is to provide
that, upon maturity of pension rights, the recipient will pay a
former spouse a predetermined equitable share of each payment
as it is received.3 2 This method is preferable "where contingen-
cies make the determination of present value difficult or where
there are insufficient marital assets from which to derive large
lump-sum payments .. . .3
125. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 137, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
126. Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 491-92, 463 N.E.2d 15, 20-21, 474
N.Y.S.2d 699, 704-05 (1984).
127. Id.
128. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 139, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. See also Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d 386, 392, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (2d
Dep't 1983), appeal dismissed, 62 N.Y.2d 646, 464 N.E.2d 990, 476 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1984).
132. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d at 139-40, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
133. Id. at 139, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
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e. Compensation for Personal Injuries
Among the items designated as separate property by the
Equitable Distribution Law is "compensation for personal inju-
ries. '1 34 To the extent that the compensation is awarded for pain
and suffering, it is rightly excluded from equitable distribution.
The pain and suffering is personal to the victim, rather than a
loss by the partnership entity. 135 The damage award, however,
may also include compensation for loss of income and for medi-
cal expenses resulting from the injury.' These losses deplete
the assets of the marital partnership, and the portion of the
compensation attributable to them should be distinguished from
the portion attributable to the pain and suffering."' "Compen-
sation for lost pay should be treated just the same as wages paid
by an employer during the same period. Medical and related ex-
penses incurred and reimbursed should be treated as other ex-
penses incurred and paid."'3 8
An analogous issue is raised by disability pensions. Al-
though some awards are made for disability alone, others are a
combination of compensation for physical injury and a regular
retirement pension. Still others simply take the place of a regu-
lar retirement pension and allow the recipient to retire earlier or
with higher payments.3 9 Consequently, courts have held that
the portion of a disability pension which represents retirement
pay will be regarded as marital property subject to equitable
distribution. 140
The distinction between the portion of the compensation al-
134. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(2) (McKinney 1986).
135. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, § 2:5, at 49-50. While this appears to
be a commonly held view, several courts in other states have nevertheless found a per-
sonal injury award to be marital property subject to division upon dissolution. See Com-
ment, supra note 87, at 550. See also Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present
Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677, 688 (1979) (Califor-
nia's characterization of a spouse's cause of action for personal injury as community
property is illustrative of the view that the damage is an injury to the community).
136. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, § 2:5, at 50.
137. Id.
138. Rich v. Rich, 126 Misc. 2d 536, 536, 483 N.Y.S.2d 150, 150 (Sup. Ct. Ontario
County 1984).
139. Newell v. Newell, 121 Misc. 2d 586, 588, 468 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1983).
140. West v. West, 101 A.D.2d 834, 475 N.Y.S.2d 493 (2d Dep't 1984); Newell v.
Newell, 121 Misc. 2d 586, 468 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1983).
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lotted to the employee's pain and suffering and that allotted to
income, expenses, and retirement benefits is consistent with the
marital partnership view of the Equitable Distribution Law, in-
sofar as only the latter portion can truly be said to be owed to
the partnership as a whole."" This dichotomy has not been
treated uniformly throughout the country, however, and com-
mentators feel that amendatory legislation is needed in New
York "to achieve the recommended dichotomy and to make a
distinction between personal and family loss." '142
2. Direct and Indirect Contributions
By statute, the nontitled spouse is allowed to share in the
increase in value of separate property which occurred during the
marriage "to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to
that spouse's contributions or efforts .... 143 "Contributions" is
defined in other parts of the statute in terms of a party's efforts
and services "as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker,
and to the career or career potential of the other party.""' Two
issues that have been raised in litigation are: (1) should the non-
titled spouse's share of the appreciated separate property be
based on an indirect as well as a direct contribution; and (2) if
indirect contributions are to be taken into account in dividing
the increases in value of the separate property, what should
those indirect contributions encompass.
It is undisputed that where the nontitled spouse makes "di-
rect" contributions toward the appreciation of the other spouse's
separate property, he or she is entitled to share in the apprecia-
tion to the extent that it was due to his or her efforts.11 5 Such
direct contributions include managing the separate property and
contributing financially towards its enhancement."" It is less
clear from the statute whether "indirect" contributions should
141. FOSTER, FREED & BRANDES, supra note 38, § 2:5 at 50.
142. Id. at 50-51.
143. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney 1986).
144. Id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(6).
145. Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, 302-03, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455, 459 (2d Dep't), later
proceeding, 115 A.D.2d 530, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455 (2d Dep't), later proceeding, 115 A.D.2d
531, 496 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1985), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d
219 (1986).
146. Price, 113 A.D.2d at 302-03, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
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be considered in determining whether to award the nontitled
spouse a share in the appreciation. 147 Some types of indirect
contributions, such as attending business related functions with
the titled spouse or preparing social events for business, can be
more easily associated with appreciation of the separate prop-
erty than can other types of indirect contributions, such as rais-
ing children, maintaining the marital home, or providing com-
panionship. 148 Nevertheless, viewing marriage as an economic
partnership requires that all of these various contributions by
the nontitled spouse be considered in determining his or her
rightful share of the increase in value of the separate
property. ' e
The Equitable Distribution Law recognizes that a marriage
involves both economic and noneconomic components, and that
the effect of each component on the overall success of the mar-
riage must be acknowledged when dividing the property that has
accumulated during the marriage."'
Certainly, nonremunerated services of a nontitled spouse to the
joint marital enterprise in the form of homemaking, raising chil-
dren and providing the moral, psychic and emotional support
necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissi-
tudes of life outside the home, thus enabling the other spouse to
concentrate his or her efforts successfully in the furtherance of
the economic interests of the marital partnership, are no less im-
portant or valuable than direct contributions made by the non-
titled spouse to enhance the value of separate property.15'
The nontitled spouse who works in the home should not be re-
warded any less for his or her efforts than the nontitled spouse
who works outside the home and directly contributes to the
marital enterprise. 52 Although the parenting and homemaking
contributions of the nontitled spouse are not directly related to
147. Id. at 303, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
148. Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1078, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (Sup. Ct. Suf-
folk County 1983).
149. Id. at 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
150. Price, 113 A.D.2d at 302, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
151. Id. at 305, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
152. Id. at 305, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 460-61. "Services as a wife, homemaker, mother,
and career builder for her husband, no longer are to be regarded as strictly a labor of
love." Foster & Freed, supra note 123, at 187.
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the appreciation of the separate property, they are deemed to
have enabled the other spouse "to engage in efforts so re-
lated."' s5 The partnership principle of equitable distribution
therefore mandates that the nontitled spouse share in the en-
hancement of the separate property.""
3. Division of Property
In a commercial partnership, unless otherwise stipulated,
the members are to share equally in the profits. 55 The Assembly
memorandum in support of the Equitable Distribution Law ap-
plies this assumption to a marital partnership while providing
for an exception in circumstances where an equitable division of
the marital property would result in injustice:
The basic premise for the marital property and alimony...
reforms of this legislation (§ 236) is that modern marriage should
be viewed as a partnership of co-equals. Upon the dissolution of a
marriage there should be an equitable distribution of all family
assets accumulated during the marriage .... From this point of
view, the contributions of each partner to the marriage should or-
dinarily be regarded as equal, and there should be an equal divi-
sion of family assets, unless such a division would be inequitable
under the circumstances of the particular case. 156
According to this view, the contributions of a homemaker
wife are presumed to be equal in value to the contributions of an
income earning husband.'57
153. Price, 113 A.D.2d at 306, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 461. See also Note, The Implied
Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property
Distribution, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 221, 227 (1974).
154. See Capasso v. Capasso, 119 A.D.2d 268, 506 N.Y.S.2d 686 (lst Dep't 1986).
See also Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (3d Dep't 1985); Note, supra
note 153, at 227.
155. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40 (McKinney 1988).
156. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 96, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 488 (2d Dep't 1983)
(quoting lc J. ZETT, M. KAUFMAN, & C. KRAUT, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE App. B, at 8).
157. Id. at 96, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 488. This policy is consistent with the view of one
commentator who has likened marriage to an implied partnership: "initially, a court
should presume that upon termination of a marriage where a partnership is determined
to exist, the property should be equally divided." Note, supra note 153, at 221. Given the
fact that certain circumstances may warrant an unequal distribution of the marital prop-
erty, however, "the burden should be upon the party asserting an unequal distribution to
show that he or she is entitled to it." Id.
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The statute lists thirteen factors that the court is to con-
sider in determining what would be an equitable division of the
marital property, including the duration of the marriage, an
award of maintenance, and the future financial circumstances of
the parties.'58 The fact that the court must consider so many
factors makes each case turn on its individual facts. Neverthe-
less, upon examination of the cases, some generalizations can be
made.
In cases where the court has declined to divide the marital
property equally, the marriage was often childless and of short
duration.1"9 Where both parties in a childless marriage were em-
ployed and contributed to the household expenses and acquisi-
tion of marital property in proportion to their respective earn-
158. The delineated factors include:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and
to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage
as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent,
wage earner, and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of
retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by
the other party;
(10) the tax consequences to each party;
(11) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial
action without fair consideration;
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 1986).
159. See, e.g., Cappiello v. Cappiello, 110 A.D.2d 608, 488 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 107, 485 N.E.2d 983, 495 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1985); Michalek v. Michalek, 114
A.D.2d 655, 494 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dep't 1985). This is the correct outcome, according to
one commentator. See Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J.
FAM. L. 263, 267-68 (1984) (a marriage is not truly a partnership unless a couple has been
married for a substantial period or unless a child is born).
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ings, the courts have divided the property according to the ratio
of the parties' earnings during the marriage.16 e In marriages
where the wife did not work outside the home, courts have
awarded the husband a larger share of the marital property for
reasons such as: it was acquired as a result of the husband's ef-
forts,"8 ' the wife had a relatively high earning potential,1 2 and
the wife had received other property of substantial value.' 65 The
underlying rationale for the court's dividing the property pro-
portionally to accumulated income is that "[e]quitable distribu-
tion, as a remedy in marital actions, is not designed to result in a
penalty or windfall." 1"
An equal division of marital property is often made when
the wife has contributed homemaking services in addition to
working outside the home. 165 In cases where the wife has pro-
vided homemaking services but has been out of the work force
during the marriage, the court will frequently divide the marital
property equally between the spouses if the marriage was of long
duration. 6" Finally, even where the parties are divorced after a
short, childless marriage during which the wife worked only part
time, an equal division of marital property may nevertheless be
warranted if the marriage began as an equal partnership and the
husband subsequently asked his wife to stop working. 67
160. See, e.g., Michalek, 114 A.D.2d at 655, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 487; Kobylack v. Koby-
lack, 96 A.D.2d 831, 465 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1983). For a justification, see Oldham,
supra note 159, at 278 (working wives without minor children to support should easily be
able to fend for themselves after divorce).
161. CappieUo, 110 A.D.2d at 609, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 400. See also Brennan v. Bren-
nan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 54, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (3d Dep't 1984).
162. Cappiello, 110 A.D.2d at 609, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
163. Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200, 489
N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1985).
164. Cappiello, 110 A.D.2d at 609, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
165. See, e.g., Day v. Day, 112 A.D.2d 972, 492 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1985); Cohen
v. Cohen, 104 A.D.2d 841, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 64 N.Y.2d 773,
475 N.E.2d 457, 485 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1984); Harness v. Harness, 99 A.D.2d 658, 472
N.Y.S.2d 234 (4th Dep't 1984).
166. See, e.g., Bisca v. Bisca, 108 A.D.2d 773, 485 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E.2d 111, 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985); Perri v. Perri, 97
A.D.2d 399, 467 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d Dep't 1983), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 603, 460
N.E.2d 136, 472 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1984).
167. See Bentley v. Knight, 92 A.D.2d 638, 459 N.Y.S.2d 935 (3d Dep't 1983); Old-
ham, supra note 159, at 268 (because neither spouse has usually made much of a sacrifice
in a short, childless marriage, such a marriage should not be considered a partnership).
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Since the presumption of an equal division of property
seems to be easily rebutted, the marriage differs from a business
partnership in that respect. Dividing the property in a way that
is equitable if not equal, however, may actually bring marriage
closer to resembling an economic partnership in a different way:
most spouses do not sign a prenuptial agreement stipulating the
future proportional division of the marital property in case of
dissolution. The property, however, may be divided by the court
in such a way as to correspond to the way the profits of the mar-
ital partnership would have been divided had the members,
before the marriage began, agreed upon a certain division after
taking into account such factors as the duration of their pro-
jected partnership and the respective contributions of each part-
ner. By dividing the marital property between the spouses pro-
portionally to accumulated income, the court is implementing a
partnership agreement that might have been created by the par-
ties had they actually treated their projected marriage as if it
were solely an economic partnership.
4. Maintenance
"[M]aintenance" is defined as "payments provided for in a
valid agreement between parties or awarded by the court. . . to
be paid at fixed intervals for a definite or indefinite period of
time . . . . "168 As when determining the appropriate division of
marital property, the court considers a number of different fac-
tors in order to determine the amount and duration of mainte-
nance.6 9 Such factors include the duration of the marriage, the
present and future earning potential of each party, and the con-
tributions made during the marriage of the party seeking main-
tenance.1 70 According to the Assembly memorandum:
[t]he objective of the maintenance provision is to award the recip-
ient spouse an opportunity to achieve independence. However, in
marriages of long duration, or where the former spouse is out of
the labor market and lacks sufficient resources, or has sacrificed
her business or professional career to serve as a parent
and a homemaker, 'maintenance' on a permanent basis may be
168. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(a) (McKinney 1986).
169. Id. § 236(B)(6)(a).
170. Id.
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necessary.171
In some respects, the maintenance provision of the Equita-
ble Distribution Law appears as a departure from the partner-
ship analogy. Upon the dissolution of a business partnership, the
members receive their respective contributions as well as their
respective share of the profits. 172 There is no provision in the
Partnership Law, however, for the continued support of any of
the partners. 173 An award of maintenance is like a claim to the
future labors of a former co-partner. No member of a dissolved
business partnership has such a claim, "even though he may
have sacrificed some of his more lucrative skills in order to ad-
vance the interests of the partnership . . . thus enabling the
other partner to enhance his marketable skills. ' 1
74
On the other hand, it is possible to view an award of main-
tenance as a logical, if not necessary, part of a true marital
partnership:
One view is that marriage is a partnership with a lifelong commit-
ment to another individual and a complete sharing of economic
costs and rewards. Implicit in the lifelong-partnership view is the
idea that the risk of divorce is small and that alimony provides a
kind of insurance against this risk. Without alimony, there is no
protection of the wife's homemaking investments. 175
By raising children and maintaining the marital home, the wife
is investing in her husband's earning capacity. His income and
the standard of living that she expects to share become partner-
ship assets.176 "If the husband's earning capacity is their major
asset, and if it is treated as his alone at divorce, the essence of
the equal partnership is violated.' 1 77
These divergent views can be reconciled when temporary,
rehabilitative maintenance is awarded in order to give the recipi-
171. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 97, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 489 (2d Dep't 1983)
(quoting 11c J. ZETT, M. KAUFMAN, & C. KRAUT, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE App. B, at 8).
172. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 71 (McKinney 1988).
173. Cf. Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10, 22, 557 P.2d 604, 616 (1976) (Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
174. Conner, 97 A.D.2d at 98, 468 N.Y.S.2d 489-90.
175. J. CASSETTy, THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 91 (1983).
176. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 374 (1985).
177. Id. at 390.
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ent spouse the opportunity to become financially independent.178
In that situation, a severance of the economic ties of the former
partners is eventually achieved. The wife is allowed to increase
her standard of living, however, and she will therefore not lose
her entire investment in the marital partnership.
5. Agreements Between Spouses
A partnership entered into for profit involves one or more
agreements made between the members of the partnership,7 9 in
addition to any business contracts made between the partner-
ship and third parties. The Equitable Distribution Law likewise
contemplates that the members of the marital partnership may
contract with each other, either before or during the marriage. 8 '
Because marriage is a "status with which the state is deeply con-
cerned,"' 8' however, a contract between spouses is viewed differ-
ently by the courts than a contract between other individuals. 1 82
In order to be enforceable in a matrimonial action, an agree-
ment between spouses must be "in writing, subscribed by the
parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to
entitle a deed to be recorded.'1 3 Furthermore, agreements be-
tween spouses will be scrutinized more closely by the court than
will ordinary business contracts. 84 Even when a marriage is
breaking up, the spouses share a confidential fiduciary relation-
ship "requiring that they exercise the utmost good faith in con-
178. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743, 747 (1985). In recent years, alimony "has come to be regarded as an interim stipend
which is available for a relatively short time while a former spouse in need prepares for
the labor market." Foster & Freed, supra note 123, at 191.
179. See, e.g., Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Oles, 152 Misc. 876, 274
N.Y.S. 349 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1934) (a partnership results from an express or
implied contract and does not arise by operation of law).
180. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney 1986).
181. Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 65, 365 N.E.2d 849, 851, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817,
819 (1977).
182. Marital contracts which predetermine property and alimony rights upon di-
vorce were at one time uniformly held unenforceable by American courts. Since 1970,
however, many courts have allowed such contracts to be enforced, with some limitations.
See generally Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless .... 21
Hous. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (1984).
183. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3).
184. Pennise v. Pennise, 120 Misc. 2d 782, 784, 466 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1983).
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tracting with each other .... 185 An agreement between a hus-
band and wife that includes a provision for maintenance or
other conditions of the marital relationship must be "fair and
reasonable" at the time the agreement is made, and must not be
unconscionable at the time the final judgment is entered."86 A
separation agreement "may be set aside as unconscionable be-
cause of facts which would be insufficient to vitiate a contract
between strangers."' 18
The legislative policy behind this special treatment of con-
tracts between spouses is to permit "enforcement of property
and support agreements in accordance with the wishes of the
parties, but subject to principles of fairness and justice."'188 En-
forcing agreements to conform to the intentions of the parties is,
of course, a goal that is applicable in a business as well as in a
marital context. Furthermore, there is little if any conceptual
difference between the state's "interest in promoting good faith
in a business deal and its interest in promoting honesty and fair-
ness in a marital agreement." '189 The stricter requirements of
fairness and reasonableness, however, that are imposed upon
transactions between married persons are probably necessary in
light of the intimate relationship between husband and wife and
the potential vulnerability of the parties that results from such a
relationship. 190
V. The "Marital Partnership" Intact
Up to this point, the focus of this comparison between a
marital partnership and an economic partnership has been the
dissolution of the relationship. Litigation between spouses over
property, support, and enforcement of contracts is relatively rare
185. Martin v. Martin, 74 A.D.2d 419, 423, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Dep't
1980). See also In re Duckman's Will, 110 Misc. 2d 575, 576, 442 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910 (Sur.
Ct. Monroe County 1981).
186. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3). American courts are split over whether the
fairness of the spousal agreement should be judged at the time of execution of the con-
tract or at the time of divorce. Oldham, supra note 182, at 766-67.
187. Martin, 74 A.D.2d at 423, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
188. Propp v. Propp, 112 A.D.2d 868, 870, 493 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1985).
189. Comment, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality
Begins at Home, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1974).
190. See id.
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during an ongoing marriage, but is "typically the last resort of
spouses whose marriage is breaking down, so that the couple
separates or seeks divorce . *.". . " Furthermore, in the absence
of conduct by the parents that is harmful to the welfare of a
child, New York has a policy of nonintervention in the internal
affairs of the family. 192 To complete the partnership comparison,
a brief discussion of some relevant issues in the context of an
ongoing marriage is necessary.
A. Management and Control of Property
All members of a partnership entered into for profit have an
equal voice in the management and conduct of the business of
the partnership.19' Furthermore, unless authorized by the other
partners, unanimous consent of all the partners is necessary to
"[a]ssign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on
the assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership."19 '
In New York, despite the view that "an inchoate interest in
[marital property] is acquired by the spouse without title imme-
diately on acquisition and during 'coverture,' ,,195 the right to
manage and control the property belongs to the titled spouse 96
and not to the marital partnership as an entity.197 There are ex-
ceptions to this general rule, however. As noted earlier,' 98 after
service of a divorce summons, the title holding spouse is no
longer free to convert the property at issue from sound assets
191. D. Westfall, supra note 26, at 294-95.
192. Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 872-73, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997-98
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
193. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40 (McKinney 1988).
194. Id. § 20.
195. Kriger v. Kriger, 115 Misc. 2d 595, 599, 454 N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982).
196. Such is generally the case in noncommunity property states. See D. Westfall,
supra note 26, at 415.
197. The joint ownership, management, and control of marital property by both
spouses is an essential element of the "partnership family model" proposed by Kraus-
kopf and Thomas. See Krauskopf and Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to
an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 558, 587 (1974). See
also Weitzman, Legal Regulation of a Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
REv. 1169, 1257 (1974) (recommending periodic division of assets and immediate vesting
as more equitable, where the housewife without management or control may be left with
few financial assets at dissolution).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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into risky assets.1 99 Even before service of the summons, the dis-
sipation of assets is indirectly prevented in several ways. In mat-
rimonial proceedings in which maintenance or support is at is-
sue, the parties are required to list all the "assets transferred in
any manner during the preceding three years, or the length of
the marriage, whichever is shorter .... ,,200 Furthermore, in de-
termining the division of marital property, the court is to take
into consideration "the wasteful dissipation of assets ....
and in determining the proper maintenance award the court is
to consider "the wasteful dissipation of marital property ....
These rules may inhibit the title holding spouse from using
his ability to control the assets to make transfers in contempla-
tion of divorce to the detriment of the other spouse. Once again,
however, it is only in the context of the dissolution of the mari-
tal partnership that the court steps in. The title holder appears
free to make any disposition of the property that he cares to
during the course of a marriage that will not end within the fol-
lowing three years.
B. Agency
Every member of a commercial partnership is an agent of
the partnership regarding the partnership business.203 The part-
nership is bound by the act of every partner who conducts the
business of the partnership in the usual way, unless the acting
partner has no authority to act for the partnership in that mat-
ter, and the person with whom he is dealing is aware of the part-
ner's lack of authority.20 4 The partnership is also deemed to
have knowledge of any matter relating to the affairs of the
partnership. 20 5
These same rules of agency are not applicable to the marital
partnership. 20 6 An agency relationship may not be inferred from
199. Kriger, 115 Misc. 2d at 597, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
200. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(4) (McKinney 1986).
201. Id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(11). 0
202. Id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(9).
203. N.Y. PARTNERSHip LAW § 20 (McKinney 1988).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 23.,
206. Such a result is warranted, especially where one spouse maintains the home
while the other operates the business. Binding one marital partner for the acts of the
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the mere fact that the parties are married,20 7 although "actual
agency may be implied from the conduct of the parties or estab-
lished by proof of subsequent ratification . . . , and, as to third
persons, may arise by estoppel."208 Furthermore, the marital re-
lationship does not, without direct proof, provide a basis for im-
puting actual or constructive knowledge on the part of either
spouse. 0 9
An exception to the lack of an agency relationship between
husband and wife exists where the husband has not provided his
wife with necessities or with funds sufficient to purchase them.
In this situation, the wife has implied authority to act as her
husband's agent to pledge his credit for the purchase of
necessities.1 l
VI. The Uniform Marital Property Act
The Uniform Marital Property Act (W;MPA), with its ap-
proach of shared property rights during marriage, 11 serves as a
basis for comparison to New York law with respect to the exami-
nation of marriage as an economic partnership.
The underlying concept embodied in the UMPA is similar
to that contained in New York's Equitable Distribution Law:
property is classified as either "marital property" or "individual
property," '12 and the kinds of property that fall under each clas-
sification are similar to the "marital property" and "separate
other in such a context may unjustifiably impose liability. See Note, supra note 153, at
232.
207. Four Winds Hospital v. Keasby, 92 A.D.2d 478, 479, 459 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (1st
Dep't), modified, 59 N.Y.2d 943, 453 N.E.2d 529, 466 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1983); Kozecke v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 46 A.D.2d 986, 362 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (3d Dep't 1974).
208. Kozecke, 46 A.D.2d at 987, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
209. Woodbine v. We Try Harder, Inc., 124 Misc. 2d 573, 576, 477 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1984).
210. Saks & Co. v. Nager, 74 Misc. 2d 855, 857, 345 N.Y.S.2d 883, 886 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1973); Amplo v. DiMauro, 52 Misc. 2d 810, 813, 276 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1967). Note, however, that the right does not belong to the wife, but,
rather is a right of action that belongs to the supplier of the necessities which may be
asserted against the husband. Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 197, at 570.
211. UMPA, Prefatory Note. The policy of sharing is considered "the guiding prin-
ciple of the Act," and its goal is to "institutionalize cooperative ownership of the prop-
erty that belongs to a married couple." Cantwell, Drafting the Uniform Marital Prop-
erty Act: The Issues and Debate, 21 Hous. L. REv. 669, 670 (1984).
212. UMPA § 4.
1989]
33
PACE LAW REVIEW
property" of equitable distribution.2 1 Other sections of the
UMPA, however, carry the marital partnership/business part-
nership analogy further than it is carried under New York law.
Under the UMPA, during marriage each spouse has "a pre-
sent undivided one-half interest in marital property."21 " The
spouses continue to hold their interest after a dissolution as ten-
ants in common, unless a decree or written consent provides
otherwise.215
Under the act, the sharing of property is recognized by crea-
tion of a present interest simultaneously with acquisition of prop-
erty by effort during marriage. The interest is legally defined and
enforceable. It permeates assets as they are acquired and contin-
ues to permeate them as they are invested and reinvested, as they
are exchanged and transferred, and as they grow or diminish. 216
A spouse acting alone may manage and control marital
property that is held in that spouse's name alone, in the name of
both spouses, or not held in the name of either spouse.217 Unlike
equitable distribution, however, there are several restrictions
that are put on such control during the marriage. For example, a
spouse who manages marital property may not, acting alone,
make a gift of such property to a third person if the value of the
transferred property is substantial considering the economic po-
sition of the spouses." 8 Furthermore, to protect a spouse's claim
to her undivided one-half interest in the marital property during
the marriage, a court may order both an accounting of the prop-
erty and an addition of a spouse's name to any marital property
held by the other spouse alone.21
It is primarily at the time of dissolution that a marriage
governed by New York law resembles an economic partnership.
Given that the UMPA provisions focus on spousal rights to
property held during the marriage, an ongoing marriage that is
governed by the sharing principles of the UMPA could more
easily be termed a "partnership" than an intact marriage in New
213. Id. See also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(1)(c), (d) (McKinney 1986).
214. UMPA § 4.
215. Id. § 17.
216. Id., Prefatory Note.
217. Id. § 5.
218. Id. § 6.
219. Id. § 15.
[Vol. 9:91
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/3
MARRIAGE PARTNERSHIP
York.
VII. Should Marriage Be Treated as a Partnership?
The foregoing discussion has examined the question of
whether a view of marriage as an economic partnership would
produce legal results different from those caused by the current
law regulating marital relationships. At this point, some perspec-
tive may be gained by a brief inquiry into the desirability and
practicality of comparing a marriage to a business partnership.
According to Mary Ann Glendon, two modern views of mar-
riage are in conflict. One envisions a marital partnership involv-
ing cooperation between the spouses and a "community of
interest."22 0
But there is another idea that has regained great currency in
contemporary society and which is in conflict with the ideology of
community. This is the notion that marriage exists primarily for
the personal fulfillment of the individual spouses and that it
should last only so long as it performs this function to the satis-
faction of each.221
This latter perception of marriage, which is contrary to
partnership principles, may actually undermine the institution
of marriage itself.222 If marriage were not viewed as a partner-
ship, and if one's educational degree, enhanced earning capacity,
or other career assets were not subject to equal division upon
dissolution, then "the law's implicit message is that one's own
career is the only safe investment."223 Rather than investing in
each other, their marriage, or their children, the spouses will
first and foremost be concerned with investing in themselves.2 4
"[Ilt is arguable that to the extent both spouses come to rely on
themselves, both gain less from the union. Indeed, a pattern of
less stable relationships when spouses are less interdependent
has already been observed . . .in a recent study .... "5
Economic fairness is another reason for fitting a marriage
220. M. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 264.
221. Id. at 321.
222. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 176, at 373.
223. Id. at 376.
224. Id. at 374.
225. Id. at 375.
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into the partnership mold. In a traditional marriage, where the
husband serves as the sole wage earner and the wife maintains
the home and cares for the children, the wife would be unfairly
harmed if she were not given an ownership interest in currently
held assets,226 as well as in any career assets her husband may
have. Because a family could live neither as cheaply nor as well
as it does without the services of a homemaker, the wife is actu-
ally providing economic contributions to the marriage, despite
the fact that homemaking does not generate any independent
income.227 A spouse who has promoted the well-being of the
marriage and the family, regardless of whether any income was
generated while doing so, should have the same rights as would a
member of a commercial partnership.
Even in a marriage where both spouses work outside the
home, fairness calls for the partnership model.
The expectation of stability and continuity and the desire for a
shared life suggest that married people are unlikely to make deci-
sions on an individual basis, but rather, the needs of each person
tend to be taken into account. Thus married people will often
make decisions differently than they would if there were no mar-
riage or marriage-like relationship functioning.228
Such decisions may involve subordinating one's own career po-
tential so that the other spouse can take advantage of a better
job opportunity or go to school to enhance future earnings. The
sacrificing spouse, however, expects that the relationship will be
permanent and, therefore, should be compensated for shattered
expectations when the relationship ends.1
29
Despite the possible desirability of classifying marriage as a
form of economic partnership, doing so may simply be infeasi-
ble, given the nature of the marital relationship. A business
partnership arises from an express or implied contract.2 30 While
226. Comment, supra note 53, at 1310.
227. Id.
228. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 6 (1977).
229. Id. at 9. But see Oldham, supra note 159, at 305 (since expectations of couples
are shaped by current law, it is circular reasoning to justify a particular policy merely
because it is consistent with the expectations of the parties).
230. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Oles, 152 Misc. 876, 274 N.Y.S. 349
(Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1934).
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marriage, too, is contractual in nature, it nevertheless differs
from other contracts."' "Indeed, it has been observed that mar-
riage resembles other contracts only in the slightest degree. It is
something more than an ordinary contract in that it involves a
personal union of those participating in it, of a character un-
known to any other human relation." 2 ' Marriage differs from
other contractual relationships both in the many restrictions
that are placed upon the ability of the parties to enter into such
a relationship, and in the inability of the parties to terminate
the relationship at will, without court approval. 3 3 Furthermore,
unlike ordinary contracts, neither the rights nor the obligations
derived from marriage can be "assigned, transferred, or
delegated." 4
In addition to creating the rights and duties inherent in all
contracts, the marriage contract creates a unique kind of
status.
3 5
In fact, some courts have gone to the extent of holding that a
marriage is not a contract, but a status created by mutual consent
of one man and one woman, and that the rights and obligations of
the parties are not contractual, but are fixed, changed, or dis-
solved by law."36
Treating marriage entirely as if it were an economic partnership
may not be practical, given that few marriages are formed solely
for the purpose of economic profit. The nature of the spousal
bond warrants treatment greater than a mere contract between
two individuals. This unique relationship, however, should not
serve as an excuse for permitting inequitable treatment that is
impermissible in similar nonmarital situations. 7
231. 52 AM. JuR. 2D Marriage § 4, at 867 (1970).
232. Id. § 5, at 868.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. § 7, at 869.
237. "The [m]arital relationship lends itself well to commercial concepts embodied
in the UPA and the implied interspousal partnership. Certain commercial statutory pro-
visions are nevertheless at odds with the realities of everyday marital life." Note, supra
note 153, at 235. A court should therefore apply those partnership principles which
would be equitable in a given situation.
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VIII. Conclusion
This Article has examined various aspects of the marital re-
lationship as they are governed by New York statutory and case
law to determine the extent that marriage is treated as an eco-
nomic partnership in New York. To promote healthy marriages
as well as economic fairness, it may be desirable to treat mar-
riage in some respects as if it were a commercial partnership.
The unique spousal relationship, however, also calls for limits to
the degree that a marriage can be regarded as an economic part-
nership. A balance must be struck between protecting each
spouse's monetary as well as nonfinancial investments in the
marriage, and viewing the bond between husband and wife as
something other than merely a convenient association motivated
by pecuniary gain.
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